Peacekeeping abroad, trouble making at home:mutinies in West Africa by Dwyer, Maggie
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peacekeeping abroad, trouble making at home
Citation for published version:
Dwyer, M 2015, 'Peacekeeping abroad, trouble making at home: mutinies in West Africa' African Affairs, vol.
114, no. 455, pp. 206-225. DOI: 10.1093/afraf/adv004
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1093/afraf/adv004
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
African Affairs
Publisher Rights Statement:
This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in African Affairs following
peer review. The version of record Dwyer, M. (2015). Peacekeeping abroad, trouble making at home: mutinies in
West Africa. African Affairs, 114(455), 206-225.  is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adv004.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
PEACEKEEPING ABROAD, TROUBLE MAKING AT HOME: 
MUTINIES IN WEST AFRICA 
 
MAGGIE DWYER* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article draws attention to a trend in which military deployments as part of peacekeeping 
missions have triggered army mutinies in some West African countries. It explains how 
participation in peacekeeping missions created new material grievances and a sense of injustice 
amongst the peacekeepers, which under certain conditions sparked domestic mutinies. These 
uprisings in West Africa follow a history of military disobedience in the region, and the article 
places them into the context of long-standing tensions within military organizations. Mutinies 
often symbolize and intensify divisions within armed forces, which can lead to further instability 
even after the mutiny is resolved.  Therefore, it is important for those interested in building and 
maintaining effective militaries to understand the ways in which deployments and peacekeeping 
participation can contribute to unrest within the armed forces. The article draws on interviews 
with former mutineers, including peacekeepers, and others military personnel in West Africa, as 
well as media reporting including public statements made by mutineers, academic writings, and 
archival research.  
 
 
 
PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS IN AFRICA by the United Nations, regional organizations, and sub-
regional organizations increased dramatically after the end of the Cold War.  Between 1990 and 2009 
approximately sixty different peacekeeping operations were deployed in Africa and the majority of 
African states have contributed troops to one or more peacekeeping mission.1 Although there are a 
wide variety of types of peace operations, the overall goal of peacekeeping is to help create the 
conditions in which conflicts can be managed and ultimately resolved. However, there has been a 
growing awareness of unintended consequences of these missions, some of which threaten to 
undermine the goals of the peace operations.2  Scholars and international organizations have raised 
awareness regarding peacekeeper involvement in sexual exploitation, trading in conflict minerals, and 
arms trafficking, while studies on peacekeeping economies have noted rises in commodity prices and 
disparities of incomes related to peacekeeping missions. 3 
  This article identifies and examines an unintended consequence of peacekeeping missions that has not 
yet received attention: peacekeeping-related mutinies. While peacekeepers are meant to contribute to 
the resolution of foreign conflicts, a pattern of mutinies following peacekeeping missions indicates that 
at times their participation can lead to new grievances and exacerbate existing tensions within the 
contributing country’s military. Thus, peacekeeping abroad may contribute to new problems at home 
bases. 
                                                        
* Maggie Dwyer (dwyer.maggie@gmail.com) is a course convener in the School of International Relations at University of 
Saint Andrews and the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. The author would like to 
thank the anonymous reviewers, the editors of African Affairs, Paul Nugent, and Sara Rich Dorman for their thoughtful 
advice on earlier versions of this work. 
1 Paul D. Williams, ‘Peacekeeping in Africa after the Cold War: Trends and challenges,’ in James Hentz (ed.), Routledge 
handbook of African security (Routledge, New York, 2014), p. 66. 
2 Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur (eds) Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations (United 
Nations University Press, New York, NY, 2007). 
3 Paul D. Williams, War & conflict in Africa (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2011), p. 202. 
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  The trend of mutinies following deployments identified in this article draws on data collected as part 
of a larger project on mutinies. The project developed the first dataset of mutinies in West Africa since 
independence, using media reporting, academic writings, and archival material.4 The research involved 
interviews with former mutineers, including peacekeepers, and other military personnel in Sierra 
Leone, Burkina Faso, and The Gambia during 2011 and 2012, as well as casual conversations with 
soldiers in Guinea and Mali during 2012.5  These first-hand accounts gathered through field research 
are supplemented with statements broadcast through the media by soldiers during the mutiny or when 
threatening to mutiny. This perspective from the lower ranks is one that has often been neglected 
within research on African militaries but is key to comprehending how militaries function, and 
particularly in understanding internal struggles which can threaten their ability to function effectively.6 
  There have been at least ten mutinies in West Africa since 1991 related to grievances by soldiers who 
participated in peacekeeping missions, with several other revolts linked to internal deployments.7  
There is also a trend of West African peacekeepers approaching the media to threaten their hierarchy 
with mutiny, giving their senior leadership a chance to respond to soldier grievances before a revolt is 
carried out. The pattern of mutinies following peacekeeping participation has occurred in eight West 
African countries, indicating that it is not simply the matter of one country’s policies.  Additionally, 
mutinies have followed missions led by the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), suggesting that the problems cannot be 
attributed to one funding or organizational body. This article focuses on West Africa, in part because 
the region has already endured numerous deployment-related mutinies, but also because West Africa’s 
significant contributions to peacekeeping missions places it at risk for future deployment-related 
mutinies. As of October 2014, 13 of the top 25 troop contributing countries to UN missions were West 
African states and the region accounts for 11 of the top 25 contributors of police forces.8  
  While this article focuses specifically on West African militaries from the 1990s onward, the pattern 
is not limited to this time period or region. For example, Ghanaian troops mutinied in 1961 while 
participating in a UN mission to the Congo. Similarly, Burundian troops mutinied in 2009 over 
grievances related to their participation in the African Union mission to Somalia. Mutinies have also 
occurred amongst African police forces involved in international peacekeeping.  
  This article defines mutiny as ‘an act of collective insubordination, in which troops revolt against 
lawfully constituted authority’ to express their communal complaints.9  The first part of the article 
explains how mutinies in an African context typically involve both material complaints and a sense of 
injustice.  It demonstrates that mutinies in West Africa follow a long history of military disobedience in 
this region and must be understood in the context of long-standing tensions within military 
organizations. The second section details common grievances among deployed or recently deployed 
soldiers and shows how these complaints often feed into a wider narrative of class gaps between the 
ranks. The article then demonstrates how peacekeeping missions provide a unique opportunity for rank 
and file soldiers to compare their conditions to soldiers from throughout the region. This can often lead 
to accusations of injustice due to the pay and condition discrepancies within countries and between 
                                                        
4 Maggie Dwyer, ‘Anticipating the revolt: Trends in military mutinies in West and Central Africa, 1960-2012’ (University 
of Edinburgh, unpublished PhD dissertation, 2014). 
5 Due to the sensitive nature of the topic, the identification of the military interviewees has been kept anonymous throughout 
the article. 
6 Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily, ‘Introduction,’ in Eboe Hutchful and Abdoulaye Bathily (eds), The military and 
militarism in Africa (CODESRIA, Dakar, 1998), p. VI; Robin Luckham, ‘The military, militarisation and democratisation in 
Africa: A survey of literature and issues,’ in Hutchful and Bathily (eds), The military and militarism in Africa, pp. 22-23. 
7 These ten cases include: Benin (2000), Burkina Faso (1999), Cote d’Ivoire (1999), Chad (2013), Gambia (1991, 1992), 
Guinea (1996), Guinea Bissau (2004), Nigeria (2000, 2008). 
8 United Nations, ‘Current Contributions to UN Peacekeeping,’ May 2014, available at 
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml> (17 November 2014). 
9 Elihu Rose, ‘The anatomy of mutiny,’ Armed Forces and Society 8, 4 (1982), p. 561. 
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contingents from different contributing countries. The last section analyses how deployments create a 
strong sense of unit cohesion alongside feelings of division from the larger hierarchy, a dynamic that is 
conducive to mutiny.  This research provides a fresh perspective of African militaries by focusing on 
the perceptions and experiences of junior soldiers.  It shows the diverse influences that shape 
mutineers’ decision to revolt against their leaders.  The analysis highlights the divisions and 
contestations that can form within armed forces engaged in international peacekeeping, challenging the 
assumption that peacekeeping is beneficial to the militaries involved. 
 
 
Understanding mutinies 
 
Generally, mutinies are viewed by military authorities and non-specialists as being primarily sparked 
by ‘basic and immediate’ material issues such as pay, living conditions, and food.10  They are regularly 
interpreted as straightforward, instantaneous reactions, often caused by the stress of war conditions.11  
However, most of the deployment-related mutinies examined in this article did not occur while soldiers 
were on the deployment but rather after they returned home, often months after the deployment had 
ended.  Thus, the action cannot be attributed to immediate stresses of combat conditions such as fear, 
mental fatigue, and sleep deprivation in the way that (primarily Western) combat mutinies are often 
explained.12 The tendency by both academics and military hierarchies to focus largely on material 
grievances related to mutinies may be partially explained by the status of the mutineers within military 
organizations.  Mutineers are generally rank and file soldiers who have historically been less educated 
and from lower-socioeconomic classes than officer ranks and their actions are often treated as 
unsophisticated. 
  There is a growing consensus among mutiny scholars that we must look beyond ‘the mundane 
material grievances that have become cliché’ in order to discover the less tangible motivations.13  A 
sense of injustice underlies most material grievances expressed through a mutiny. Mutinying soldiers 
usually draw on values concerning what they believe is unfair treatment or irresponsible behaviour by 
superiors within a military context.  In mutinies related to deployments, the sense of injustice is often 
related to the soldiers’ status as combat veterans.  Recently deployed soldiers, both in West Africa and 
in militaries worldwide, often believe that combat veterans deserve a heightened level of respect for 
having endured the mission. This is reinforced by military hierarchies with traditions of medals, 
awards, and other honours given to veterans.  The sense of pride associated with deployment 
experience was also apparent in more subtle ways during field research with soldiers throughout West 
Africa.  During interviews or casual conversations, deployment experiences were regularly one of the 
first topics that soldiers brought up.  On several occasions soldier interviewees made a point to show 
their physical scars from their deployments.  It demonstrated a pride in the combat and physical danger 
associated with the experience.  The respect for veterans among their peers was also apparent in the 
language used by military interviewees who had not deployed.  For example, it was common for 
soldiers to described comrades with combat experience as ‘battle-tested’ or ‘battle-hardened’.  It was 
always said with admiration.  The material grievances of combat veterans, such as lack of payment or 
                                                        
10 Geoffrey Parker, ‘Forward’ in Jane Hathway (ed.) Rebellion, repression, reinvention: Mutiny in comparative perspective 
(Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 2001), p. viii. 
11 Christopher Ankersen, ‘Beyond mutiny? – Instrumental and expressive understandings of contemporary “collective 
indiscipline”’ in Craig Leslie Mantle (ed.) The unwilling and the reluctant: Theoretical perspectives on disobedience in the 
military (Canadian Defence Academy Press, Ontario, 2006), p. 123.  
12 Joel Hamby, ‘The mutiny wagon wheel: A leadership model for mutiny in combat,’ Armed Forces & Society 28, 4 
(2002), pp. 575-600. 
13 Hathaway, “Introduction” in Rebellion, repression, reinvention: Mutiny in comparative perspective, p. XV. 
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inadequate equipment, are generally viewed as particularly offensive by military personnel due to the 
hardships and sacrifices of the deployment.  
  The post-deployment mutinies described in this article should be viewed in the context of a larger 
pattern of military disobedience in the region.  West Africa has the highest rate of coups on the 
continent, which has shaped the internal dynamics of many militaries.14   In addition to the direct spoils 
of office for military officers and units involved in coups, there have often been attempts to stabilize 
the military through ‘buy-outs.’15 As Samuel Decalo explains, the quest to keep military officers out of 
politics has led to a ‘very visible trade-off of material benefits … in exchange for political fealty.’16  As 
a result, in many ‘African states, civil or military, army officers play a major role in the commercial 
sector’ and are considered elites, but these ‘enticements … have mostly benefitted senior officers’ and 
have created sharp class divisions between ranks in the military.17 While all military hierarchies 
involve differences in pay and privilege, in a West African context the differences are often extreme.  
In his analysis of West African militaries, Jimmy Kandeh notes:  
 
Ordinary soldiers observe and take exception to the sudden embourgeoisment of their officers, which 
many have come to rightly believe occurs at their expense.  Resentment based upon perceptions that 
officers are ‘stiffing’ the ranks, ‘chopping them small', and siphoning their supplies has often been the 
center of the grievance narrative of subaltern mutineers and insurgents.18   
 
  The following analysis of post-deployment mutinies builds on the work of Kandeh, as well as others 
scholars such as Robin Luckham and Michael Lofchie, who have also emphasized the significance of 
class differences within African military structures.19 It demonstrates that the material grievances of 
mutineers who have recently deployed are often closely linked to suspicions and resentment over the 
conditions of the junior ranks compared to the senior officers. As examples from West Africa will 
illustrate, mutineers’ complaints of delays in salary or inadequate equipment are also regularly 
accompanied by claims that superiors have ‘sliced’ money meant for troop salary or welfare.  
Similarly, discrepancies in peacekeeping pay are regularly viewed by the junior ranks as evidence of 
officer malpractice.  Deployments often aggravate the long-standing resentments by placing mostly 
rank and file soldiers in hardship conditions while the senior hierarchy typically remains at home bases.   
 
 
Deployment-specific grievances 
 
When soldiers deploy, whether within their own borders to counter an internal threat or internationally, 
there are likely to be complications that are not be present when at their home bases.  For some, 
peacekeeping missions may provoke an image of soldiers deployed to an environment that is tense but 
in which the conflict has been largely contained.  However, many of the peacekeeping missions in 
which West African troops have partaken occur where no peace has yet been established and regularly 
                                                        
14 Patrick J. McGowan, ‘African military coups d'etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, trends and distribution,’ The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 41, 3 (2003), p. 356.   
15 Samuel Decalo, Africa: The lost decades (Florida Academic Press, Gainesville, FL., 2012), p. 328. 
16 Samuel Decalo, ‘Modalities of civil-military stability in Africa,’ The Journal of Modern African Studies 27, 4 (1989), p. 
573. 
17 Jimmy Kandeh, Coups from below: Armed subalterns and state power in West Africa (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 
NY, 2004), p. 208. 
18 Ibid., 7. 
19 Robin Luckham, ‘The military, militarization and democratization in Africa: A survey of literature and issues,’ African 
Studies Review 37, 2 (1994), pp. 13-75; Michael F. Lofchie, ‘The Uganda coup- class action by the military,’ The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 10, 1 (1972), pp. 19-35. 
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involve intense, combat-related conditions.20  The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations (Brahimi Report) in 2000 showed evidence that ‘the current era of “complex” peacekeeping 
in civil-war-torn states has seen a drastic shift away from developed-country blue helmets- the standard 
practice during the Cold War – towards blue helmets supplied by third world states.’21  While this trend 
has been criticized for having ‘an unpleasant mercenary flavor, whereby rich countries appear to pay 
soldiers from very poor countries to undertake dangerous peacekeeping jobs’ the pattern has not shifted 
since the Brahimi report was issued over a decade ago.22  Therefore, it is an unfortunate reality that 
West African troops are involved in the most dangerous missions.  This is an important point in the 
discussion of deployment-related mutinies because the risks of the mission are often part of the 
justification for the revolt. As the discussion below will demonstrate, the hardships and physical danger 
associated with the deployments often provoke an added sense of entitlement by soldiers.  The risk also 
places heightened intensity on the importance of the grievances over equipment, training, and 
leadership. 
  While on deployment supplies, equipment, and logistics are required that would not be necessary 
while stationed at home.  These further needs often do not coincide with additional funding and 
soldiers often claim that they have not received the required equipment.  Additionally, the deployment 
environment, often to remote locations, makes resupply challenging, especially for states that lack 
aircraft or transportation vehicles.  
  However, many of the deployment grievances related to supplies and equipment are not new; instead, 
old complaints take on a new level of importance when they occur in a deployment setting.  Soldiers 
commonly grumble about not having equipment or uniforms while in the barracks but these concerns 
become more significant when a soldier is deployed.  Equipment is of limited relevance in the day-to-
day lives of soldiers; however, in combat, outdated equipment or lack of supplies such as ammunition 
can be the difference between life and death.  These equipment concerns have contributed to mutinies 
following internal deployments as well as peacekeeping deployments.  For example, Sierra Leonean 
soldiers planned a revolt while deployed to counter rebel forces on the eastern border with Liberia in 
1992.  Their complaints included lack of equipment, uniforms, boots, food, medical care, and 
inconsistent pay.  These were not necessarily new complaints; the government had long been 
neglecting the military.23  However, on deployment the old complaints led to new complications on the 
ground for the soldiers, including casualties within the unit, and severely altered their attitudes towards 
the mission and their chain of command.  One soldier from this unit explained that the group was 
‘demoralized every time we go to battle’ due to the lack of supplies and support.24  The case of Sierra 
Leone in 1992 shows an extreme case of the potential outcomes of neglecting deployed soldiers as the 
plan for a mutiny quickly escalated to a successful coup. 
  The material grievances that developed during the deployment were key to the revolt, but these 
welfare shortfalls were also viewed by the unit as a direct contradiction to the lifestyles of the senior 
hierarchy back in Freetown.  For example, a rank and file soldier involved in the 1992 revolt described 
the cause of the incident in the following way: ‘We are at the warfront, we are not being paid on time, 
we are not well catered for, we need better medical facilities.  And authorities are sitting in Freetown, 
                                                        
20 Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the international system, (Routledge, New York, NY, 2006), p. 245. 
21 James D. Fearon and David Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the problem of weak states,’ International Security 28, 4 (2004), 
p. 25; William J. Durch, et. al.  The Brahimi Report and the future of United Nations peace operations (Washington D.C., 
The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), p. 71. 
22 James D. Fearon, ‘International institutions and collective authorization of the use of force,’ in Alan Alexandroff (ed.) 
Can the world be governed? Possibilities for effective multilateralism (W. Laurier University Press,Waterloo, Ontario, 
2008), p. 20.  
23 David Keen, Conflict and collusion in Sierra Leone, (Palgrave, New York, NY, 2005), p. 17; E.D.A. Turay and A. 
Abraham, The Sierra Leone army, (Macmillan, London, 1987). 
24 Interview, Sierra Leonean military officer, Sierra Leone, May 2011. 
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driving luxurious cars.’25  This is similar to the narrative presented by the junior officers of the unit 
when they came to power.  In Captain Strasser’s first speech as leader of the junta he stated, ‘our 
soldiers continue to sacrifice their lives on the war front in spite of very poor logistic support provided 
by the government, whose leadership sit in Freetown enriching themselves by gross misappropriation 
of war funds.’26  In these examples the soldiers expressed material grievances but also a sense of 
injustice at their hardship conditions compared to what they viewed as excessive lifestyles of the senior 
hierarchy.  They blamed the senior leadership for the lack of proper equipment and also specifically 
accused them of benefitting from the unit’s hardships. 
  Deployments can also expose neglect for military readiness that goes beyond material supplies and 
equipment.  Soldiers often quickly perceived that they were not given proper training for the type of 
combat they experience.  Similar to the concerns over equipment shortfalls, the lack of adequate 
training becomes intensely important and apparent in the midst of a combat scenario. Combat situations 
can also reveal that the unit’s ground leadership or other support elements such as intelligence lack 
proper training. 
  Insufficient training and support was a particular concern of soldiers during the ECOWAS Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission to Liberia (1990-1998).  As this was the first peacekeeping 
mission led by a sub-regional organization in Africa, part of the planning shortfalls may be attributed to 
the “newness” of this type of operation. ‘Funmi Olonisakin’s research with ECOMOG participants 
reveals how a lack of preparation and misperceptions about the severity of the conflict ‘seriously 
weakened’ morale amongst the soldiers. 27 For example, the early stages of the mission lacked basic 
intelligence reports and maps.  She quotes a Nigerian General who stated that in his country ‘the 
planners did not heed warnings at the planning stage, to prepare the troops for possible combat in 
Liberia.’28  Rank and file soldiers backed up the General’s observation by stating that they were never 
given an accurate picture of the situation in Liberia.  As junior soldiers made up the bulk of the 
deployed units, inadequate preparation or support likely had the greatest effect on the rank and file 
soldiers.  Perceptions that they have been deceived about the nature of the mission or neglected on the 
deployment easily fit into common pre-existing tensions between the lowest ranks and their superiors 
in the region. 
  Another common grievance among mutineers that is unique to a deployment setting involves 
accusations from mutineers that they have been misled about the required length of deployment.  
Deployment lengths have been a key complaint in several recent mutinies and mutiny-threats.  For 
example, Chadian troops deployed to Mali as part of MINUSMA mutinied over their length of 
deployment in 2013 and Sierra Leonean troops on AMISOM in Somalia publicly expressed 
dissatisfaction and threatened their officers over charges that they had been deployed beyond their year 
contract in 2014.29  Similarly, a month extension beyond their deployment contract was the center of a 
mutiny threat by Nigerian troops deployed on the UN/AU mission to Darfur in 2012.  The soldiers’ 
lengthy public statement reveals common themes of deployment-related mutinies.  For example, they 
expressed a perception of dishonor at their treatment in relation to their veteran status by noting that the 
extension represented the government’s failure to pay ‘respect to their men and women on tour of 
                                                        
25 Interview, Sierra Leonean enlisted soldier, Sierra Leone, May 2011. 
26 West Africa, 11 May 1992, p. 789. 
27 ‘Funmi Olonisakin, Reinventing peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and legal issues in ECOMOG operations (Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague, 2000), p. 147. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Reuters, ‘Chadian Troops Abandon North Mali Posts in Protest,’ 18 September 2013 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/18/us-mali-chad-troops-idUSBRE98H13120130918> (8 December 2014); Kemo 
Cham, ‘Sierra Leone AU Troops ‘Want out of Somalia,’ Africa Review, 11 May 2014, 
<http://www.africareview.com/News/-/979180/2310958/-/7dswu/-/index.html> (8 December 2014). 
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duty.’30 The mutineers accused the government of treating them ‘as if [they] are not humans’ and 
threatened to ‘create a scenario which will deter the ongoing peace process in Darfur’ if they were not 
flown home by a given date.31 Similar to most deployment-related mutinies, they blamed their 
grievances on officer negligence and corruption. These West African examples are consistent with 
wider research on the psychology of international peacekeeping missions, which have shown that 
uncertainty in the length of deployment is one of the critical issues impacting stress levels among 
peacekeepers.32 
 
 
Pay problems 
 
In addition to grievances surrounding equipment, training, and deployment lengths, pay is also a key 
complaint of most deployment-related mutinies.  The pay grievances take on several different forms, 
the most basic being that soldiers simply have not received their due pay.  At times this is directly 
linked to the logistical problems and hierarchies have claimed to have difficulties physically getting the 
salaries to soldiers.33  Even when soldiers do receive their salaries, it is common for those on 
deployment to feel as if the amount is not adequate, particularly in relation to the deployment 
conditions.  The greater risks associated with deployments often lead to a heightened sense of 
entitlement in terms of pay.  Soldiers on deployment or returned from deployment believe they are due 
more from the government or military hierarchy as a result of their experience.  These two types of pay 
grievances are not mutually exclusive and at times mutineers have claimed that their inadequate 
salaries are late. 
  A combination of the above pay grievances contributed to mutinies by returned ECOMOG soldiers in 
The Gambia in 1991 and 1992, the first mutinies the country had experienced.  The mutineers both 
charged that they had not been paid their salaries and that the promised pay was not adequate given the 
hardships of the mission. For example, one former soldier explained ‘soldiers on the ground must be 
paid better, they were facing war every day.  They should be paid more.  Why would anyone risk their 
life for that?’34  Another Gambian military interviewee noted ‘they were in real war situations, so for 
them to not get paid was a real problem.’35  Similarly a former Gambian soldier discussing the mutinies 
stated, ‘soldiers felt that they were in Liberia risking their lives and still the amount of money they 
were expecting was not reaching them … they were exposed to danger and … they don’t get the money 
they expected.’36  In these quotes, the soldiers explained that the problem was not only an issue of pay, 
rather the pay issues combined with the risks of the mission that made the situation unacceptable. They 
show that there is a recalculation of what a soldier is entitled to depending on the conditions. Danger is 
considered a chargeable experience and the soldiers expect to be compensated for it. In the case of the 
1992 Gambian mutiny, the amount owed was relatively small, totaling US$45 per soldier.37  Gambian 
soldiers who were in the military at the time explained that the action was as much about perceptions of 
disrespect towards the recently deployed soldiers as it was about pay.38 
                                                        
30 Abdulkadir Badsha and Misbahu Bashir, ‘Nigeria: Darfur Operations-Nigerian Soldiers Threaten Mutiny - Ask to be 
Airlifted Home,’ Daily Trust, 26 June 2012 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201206260968.html> (8 December 2014). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Amy B. Adler, Brett T. Litz, and Paul T. Bartone, ‘The nature of peacekeeping stressors,’ in Thomas W. Britt and Amy 
B. Adler (eds) The psychology of the peacekeeper (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003), pp. 152-153. 
33 Olonisakin, Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa, pp.178-186. 
34 Interview, Gambian former enlisted soldier, phone interview, October 2012. 
35 Interview, Gambian former military officer, phone interview, August, 2012. 
36 Interview, Gambian former enlisted soldier, phone interview, October 2012. 
37 The Point (The Gambia), 10 February 1992. 
38 Interview, Gambian former military officer, phone interview, September 2012; Interview, Gambian enlisted soldier, 
Banjul, May 2012; Interview, Gambian military officer, Banjul, May 2012.  
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  Similar to most West African mutinies, the Gambian soldiers placed the blame for their grievances on 
the senior hierarchy.  One soldier explained that the deployment pay did not reach the soldiers because 
‘the senior officers were robbing them.’39  Another Gambian interviewee expanded on this idea by 
stating ‘the top brass got the [deployment] money and sliced it, only gave some to the soldiers.’40  
These accusations were difficult to verify, but they appeared to be widely believed by soldiers and 
furthered existing tensions that had been building between the ranks at the time.  The Gambian 
mutineers in 1991 demonstrated that the goals of their action went beyond just receiving their due pay 
by also calling for the dismissal of the country’s highest ranking officer, Colonel Ndow Njie, a call to 
which President Jawara conceded. In the case of the Gambian mutinies, the claims by the peacekeepers 
were seen to both represent and perpetuate growing distrust between the junior and senior ranks.  
  The grievances about ECOMOG pay were not unique to the Gambian contingent. It was common for 
ECOMOG soldiers in Liberia to go months without payment and many remained uncompensated when 
they returned home.  Part of the complications can be attributed to context of the ECOMOG mission to 
Liberia.  This was the first peacekeeping venture for ECOWAS to organize and it occurred at a time 
when many states were experiencing major internal economic constraints.  The ECOWAS Standing 
Mediation Committee agreed ‘that troops from participating countries were to be self-sufficient for the 
first thirty days, after which ECOWAS was to pick up the funding, but it was unable to do so.’41  
ECOWAS’s goal of collecting fifty million dollars in donations from African states and other 
international donors was not met, which resulted in incomplete funding for the new force.42  This may 
explain why countries such as The Gambia struggled to provide the extra deployment pay.  
  However, even in the later stages of the mission when the conflict had received more international 
attention and monetary contributions, funding remained a problem, often due to the complexity of the 
multinational, multi-organizational mission.  For example, problems arose when ECOMOG soldiers 
were ‘rehatted’ into the UNMIL mission in 2003.43  In 2004, soldiers from Guinea Bissau staged a 
mutiny demanding unpaid wages from their involvement in the ECOMIL/UNMIL mission.  They 
accused their army chiefs of pocketing their peacekeeping payments while the army chiefs accused the 
UN of not paying the salaries from the transition from ECOMOG to UNMIL.44   
  It may be understandable that complications would arise over issues of funding in missions in which 
numerous nations and several international organizations are involved, yet soldiers were generally not 
sympathetic to the funding difficulties at the organizational level.  When they were not paid on time 
they did not seem to question if the organization was at fault, but rather blamed their officers or others 
above them.  This makes particular sense within a military chain of command, because officers are seen 
as being responsible for taking care of those who work under them.  This is significant because it 
means delays in payments for multinational missions, regardless of who is at fault, have the potential to 
cause divisions and suspicions between the ranks of the contributing nation’s military.   
  If material grievances are a key driver of deployment-related mutinies, one would hypothesize that 
more adequately funded peacekeeping missions such as those funded by the UN would be less likely to 
provoke mutinies. However, mutinies and threats to mutiny have also followed West African 
                                                        
39 Interview, former Gambian military officer, phone interview, August 2012. 
40 Interview, Gambian academic, USA, June 2012. 
41 Eboe Hutchful, ‘The ECOMOG experience with peacekeeping in Africa,’ in Mark Malan (ed.) Whither Peacekeeping in 
Africa? (Monograph No 36, Institute for Security Studies, April 1999) 
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42 Herbert Howe, Ambiguous order: Military forces in African states (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2000), p. 
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43 While the original ECOMOG mission to Liberia ended in 1998, a second mission was established in 2003. However, it 
was soon transitioned into a UN mission. 
44 Mark Malan, ‘Transition with minimal assistance: Lessons from Guinea-Bissau?’ (Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Paper No. 5, March 2005), pp. 14-15.  
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participation in UN funded missions.  The material grievances in these mutinies take a slightly different 
angle than the grievances presented above and are related to the way salaries are allocated.  
  There is no shortage of soldiers volunteering to go on UN missions in West Africa, largely due to the 
significantly increased pay compared to what they would make stationed at home. Despite the regular 
pay grievances of peacekeepers, the lack of alternative economic opportunities in the region, especially 
for rank and file soldiers with limited advanced training or education, makes deployment on a 
multinational mission a coveted opportunity. Additionally, the missions provide experience that could 
be valuable for promotions or future job opportunities. For some, the appeal of traveling or simply 
breaking the routine of life in the barracks may be appealing.  
  It is not only soldiers and their families who benefit financially from involvement in multinational 
missions; the military as a whole also stands to gain.  A report from the Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Center explains how this is the case for Ghanaian participation in UN 
operations: 
 
The Government … is reimbursed for the ordinary contingent member with an amount of $1096 
per month while for the specialist an amount of $1399 per month is reimbursed.  Considering 
that the ordinary contingent member is paid $20 a day (making $600 a month for 30 days), while 
provision is made for catering and some of the other provisions under self-sustainment (not 
readily quantifiable), the country makes significant profits on each ordinary contingent member 
and specialist that it deploys on a UN mission.45 
 
In addition to the financial benefits, the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Canada (among 
others) offer training programs to African militaries contributing troops to multinational missions.46  
Furthermore, there are lease reimbursement programs, which enable African militaries to upgrade their 
equipment.47  
  On the one hand, this may seem like a win for all, as both individuals and the country benefit, but the 
discrepancy between what the UN pays the country and what the individual soldiers receive has been a 
source of grievance among peacekeepers.  The UN is very transparent about what it pays a country for 
peacekeepers and the $1096/$1399 figures are publicly available.  The UN transparency contrasts with 
the lack of transparency usually found in the defense industry where contracts, spending, and individual 
pay are often not publicly available information.  Countries contributing troops to multinational 
missions justify paying peacekeepers less than the pay allotted by the UN because there are internal 
expenses involved in the deployment.  Additionally, it leaves the contributing country without those 
troops.  In terms of mutinies it is less important to determine if the pay difference is justified and more 
important to understand how soldiers view the discrepancy.   
  When soldiers are unclear what the additional money from multinational missions is being used for, 
they often assume corruption is involved.  Interviews with current soldiers in Sierra Leone illustrate 
this point.  One soldier explained, the peacekeepers ‘are not happy, they are grumbling. 1225 [US 
dollars] to country but we only get 400 [US dollars].  We do not know what the government is using 
the money for.’48  In a separate interview a soldier stated: 
 
                                                        
45 Emma Birikorang, ‘Ghana’s regional security policy: Costs, benefits, and consistency’ (Kofi Annan International 
Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra, Paper No. 20, September 2007), p. 8. 
46 Ibid., 6. 
47 Kwesi Aning, ‘Unintended consequences of peace operations for troop-contributing countries from West Africa: The case 
of Ghana’, in Aoi, de Coning and Thakur (eds) Unintended consequences of peacekeeping operations, pp. 135-137. 
48 Interview, Sierra Leonean enlisted soldier, Sierra Leone, April 2012. In 2013 the government of Sierra Leone publicly 
stated that its peacekeepers make $828 per month. However, in interviews during 2011 and 2012, $400 seemed to be the 
commonly rumored pay.  
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If you think, they [the Sierra Leone government] are making something like one million, two 
million dollars over six months and they are not doing anything, not buying uniforms, not 
buying medicine for soldiers.  They are not helping those that are representing us in Darfur.  
They are managing it poorly.  If they don’t change the system it will happen.49   
 
The ‘it’ in the quote is referring to a mutiny.  Another Sierra Leonean soldier speculated that the 
officers were benefitting from the missions by noting their lifestyles which he felt could not be 
maintained on a regular salary.50    
  Similar complaints were expressed to the press by Nigerian soldiers who had participated in the 
MINUSMA mission in Mali in 2013. They argued that the government had not given them an 
explanation for why they only received part of what the UN pays for peacekeepers.  They expressed 
their frustrations in relation to the dangers of the mission by stating ‘they have cheated us after we have 
risked our lives, left our families for seven months.’51  Another interviewed soldier put forward the 
common accusation that officers were benefitting from their hardship by explaining ‘it is sad our ogas 
are treating us like this and feeding fat on us on the field.’52 
  The grievances of peacekeepers extend beyond claims of officers pocketing parts of their salary. 
Soldiers have also argued that the process of selection for peacekeeping missions has been corrupted.  
For example, soldiers in Sierra Leone alleged that in order to be selected to go on a peacekeeping 
mission, they are expected to pay the assigning officers ‘something like ten percent … It is a mission, if 
you are fortunate to go they want you to give ten percent. If you don’t do it they hold up your rank, 
they make you relinquish your appointment.’53  Similar accusations were made in the Sierra Leone 
media in 2013 and which the government strongly denied.54  These accusations are not unique to Sierra 
Leone and various examples can be found throughout West African countries contributing to 
peacekeeping missions. The financial opportunities that are often associated with involvement in UN 
operations can create new avenues for perceptions of injustices. However, the new grievances follow a 
similar narrative based on suspicions over the gaps between the ranks.  
 
 
Revealing the greener grass 
 
Another unique aspect of peacekeeping operations is the ability for soldiers to compare their conditions 
to those from other countries.  On multinational peacekeeping operations soldiers live and work 
together with foreign comrades usually for extended periods of time.  The individual soldiers perform 
the same job as their fellow peacekeepers, under similar conditions but each is paid by their home 
government.  However, the various countries contributing troops do not pay the same amount to the 
soldiers they deploy.  The economic conditions and cost of living between countries in the region vary 
widely and thus it could be expected that salaries would also vary.  From the perspective of the 
soldiers, those that are on the lower end often view the pay difference with contempt. Soldiers compare 
more than just pay when on multinational missions. Differences between countries regarding uniforms, 
food, equipment, leadership styles, and specific country military procedures, such as the way they 
                                                        
49 Interview, Sierra Leonean enlisted soldier, Sierra Leone, May 2011. 
50 Interview, Sierra Leonean enlisted soldier, Sierra Leone, May 2011. 
51 Musdapha Ilo, ‘Army Short Changes Nigerian Peacekeepers,’ International Centre for Investigative Reporting, 19 
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52 Ibid. 
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54 Kemo Cham, ‘Pay scandal rocks Sierra Leone’s troops in Somalia’, Africa Review, 17 October 2013, 
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handle casualties or schedule troop rotations, have also served as a basis for grievances among 
peacekeepers.   
  For many of the junior soldiers deployed on multinational missions it is likely their first time to 
extensively engage with colleagues from other countries.  The new experience also brings new insights 
and makes some soldiers question their own conditions, particularly in comparison to others. This 
observation is comparable to arguments made by academics in the 1960s and 1970s that African 
military officers often revised their view of their expectations and roles following exposure to a wide 
variety of military personnel and ideas through attendance at Western military academies.55 Similar 
patterns occurred in pre-independent Africa as well.  Collective action taken by members of the 
tirailleurs sénégalais following deployments abroad during World War II is one such example.56   
  The ECOMOG mission to Liberia serves as a good example of the ways that grievances can arise 
from the ability of troops to compare themselves to contingents from other countries.  As a sub-
regionally led mission, it brought numerous soldiers from countries in close geographic proximity and 
with similar socio-economic statuses together.  However, there were wide variations in the pay and 
conditions among the contributing countries and the differences were a key part of several mutinies that 
followed participation in ECOMOG.  For example, a Gambian officer explained that an aspect to the 
1991 and 1992 mutinies following the multinational mission in Liberia was that the soldiers ‘believed 
they were being paid less than their counterparts from other countries.’57 Similarly, mutinying 
peacekeepers in Burkina Faso in 1999 said they found out that the Malian peacekeepers were receiving 
$610 per month for the ECOMOG mission, while they only made $230.58   
  The difference in uniforms was ‘one of the most glaring aspects’ of differentiation between the troops 
in ECOMOG. The Nigerian soldiers in particular were so undersupplied and outfitted compared to the 
other soldiers that they often purchased uniforms from other contingents.59  In Olonisakin’s interviews 
a Nigerian officer explained that it was ‘disheartening to note that of all the contingents in Ops. Liberty 
the Nigerian contingent is the most badly turned out.’60 A rank and file Nigerian soldier stated, ‘When I 
arrived here [Liberia], a Guinean soldier was kind enough to give me one of his uniforms.  Although it 
was a bigger size, it was better than what I had.  Other countries do not have this problem of 
uniform.’61 In these examples, the respondents noted the condition of the Nigerians in comparison to 
the other contingents.  The ability to see themselves next to better-outfitted soldiers seemed to add 
shame and anger to the situation.  This was likely especially the case for Nigerians because Nigeria was 
funding the majority of the mission and thus one would expect its soldiers to be the best equipped, not 
the worst.  In a military context, uniforms are much more than assigned clothing.  Generally military 
uniforms are seen as being earned, with individuals not allowed to wear the full uniform until passing a 
certain level of training and tests. There are strict protocols on how to wear uniforms and discipline for 
those who wear it incorrectly.  There is usually a high level of pride associated with military uniforms 
and to be denied uniforms or have uniforms in poor shape is likely to be demoralizing. 
  Insight into the conditions of other soldiers in the ECOMOG mission led to dissatisfaction in a variety 
of other areas. A former Gambian soldier argued that the Gambian contingent was undertrained 
                                                        
55 John Michael Lee, African armies and civil order (Chatto and Windus, Ltd., London, 1969), pp. 92-93; William 
Gutteridge, Military regimes in Africa (Methuen & Co Ltd., Suffolk, 1975), pp. 28-29; Ruth First, The barrel of a gun: 
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(Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2006).  
57 Interview, Gambian military officer, Banjul, May 2012. 
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60 Ibid. 
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compared to other West African soldiers and other countries were more prepared to deal with 
casualties.62  Additionally, during the ECOMOG mission, Nigerian troops frequently complained that 
the Ghanaian troops were eating better than them.63  Morale within the ECOMOG force furthered 
declined when the UN and US-funded troops from Tanzania and Uganda joined an ‘expanded’ 
ECOMOG.  These East African troops received three times the original ECOMOG pay, as well as 
better provisions.64  Mutineer grievances that stemmed from the ability of troops to evaluate the 
conditions of other troops highlights the framework that mutinies generally involve both a material 
grievance and a sense of injustice.  In these examples, soldiers expressed their desire for better pay or 
uniforms but the claims were made in comparison to others.  They suggested that the disparities 
between themselves and others troops on the same mission were an insult.   
 
 
Cohesion and division 
 
While the previous sections have described the types of grievances that often develop during 
deployments, it is also possible that the deployment setting contributes to the development of a mutiny 
by altering the dynamics of the unit. In the most basic sense, deployed soldiers are physically separated 
from the larger military organization.  Units may feel freer to discuss or plan a mutiny away from the 
watchful eyes of their senior hierarchy.  Beyond the issue of distance from their home bases, 
deployments often lead to strong group cohesion.65  During deployments ‘members are immediately 
known to each other and their actions are interdependent, mutually supporting, and reciprocal’.66  
Soldiers deployed together are in constant contact with each other, not only during intense combat 
situations, but also during the long mundane downtime, which inevitably occurs on deployments.  In 
more recent years with the increase in peacekeeping missions, units will often spend months together 
prior to the deployment in preparatory training. These shared experiences of hardships as well as the 
consistent close proximity often create close interpersonal bonds between members of the unit which 
may be absent or weakened when stationed at home.   
  Military scholars regularly discuss cohesion in relation to its ability to create more efficient and 
motivated units. Anthony King explains that there is a common presumption that the close personal 
relationships formed within cohesive units ‘generate good performances because it motivates the 
individual members to fight.’67  However, he draws on various studies that show a darker side of 
cohesion, one that can motivate individuals into deviant behavior together.  The close bonds can cause 
the group to subvert or ignore their authorities as well as their obligation to the organization. Guy 
Siebold explains that highly cohesive units may be particularly likely to disobey orders when ‘peer 
bonding is strong and bonding with leaders is poor.’68  The deployment experience can increase the 
peer bonding as well as the divisions between the deployed soldiers and their leadership based at home, 
increasing the likelihood of disobedience.  King cites cases of Western mutinies such as French and 
Australian troops during World War I and American troops during the Vietnam War among his various 
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examples of deviant military behavior among combat units.69 African deployment-related mutinies can 
be added to this list of indiscipline, which are also likely affected by increased group cohesion. 
  Mutinies are a unique dynamic in that they often involve both a strong bond within the group as well 
as a level of detachment from the larger organization. Mutinies require trust within the group as they 
must have faith that the individuals will stick together during negotiations or a potential counter attack.  
Shared deployment experiences may enhance this trust.  However, in addition to the increased group 
cohesion, the experience may also lead to feelings of division, isolation, and dissatisfaction from the 
larger military hierarchy.  The division between those that have deployed and those that have not also 
largely follows the rank structure, as combat deployments consist mostly of rank and file soldiers led 
by junior officers.  Senior officers are much less likely to engaged in deployments or combat.  This 
division builds on the often significant economic divisions between the junior ranks and senior officers 
in West Africa, which has been described throughout this article. 
  This kind of “unified division” may be particularly explosive when combined with the deployment 
selection process in some African states.  For example, President Abacha in Nigeria was accused of 
having used ‘ECOMOG postings to get rid of troublesome units and officers.’70  This pattern extends 
beyond Nigeria to other states with bloated militaries. Multinational missions can serve as a ‘release 
valve’ by stationing a portion of the military outside the country for a period of time.71  This type of 
selection process is likely to be particularly risky in relation to mutinies, as soldiers who are already 
weary of the government or military hierarchy may become further discontented by unfulfilled 
expectations from the mission. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has contributed new findings to the study of mutinies in Africa as well as the unintended 
consequences of peacekeeping.  Participation in peacekeeping missions is often considered to be a way 
to provide troops with additional experience and pay, while also contributing to regional stability.  
However, the analysis presented here indicates that at times grievances developed on the deployment 
can lead to mutinies within the ranks and exacerbate existing tensions that have been prevalent in West 
African militaries.  
  Examples of deployment-related mutinies demonstrate that mutinies generally involve the interplay of 
material grievances and a sense of injustice.  In deployment-related mutinies the perception of injustice 
is closely linked to a heightened expectation of respect for combat veterans. Alongside demands for 
material redress is often language that speaks of the desire to defend the honor of those that have served 
their country in life-threatening scenarios. While West African states have become increasingly 
involved in multinational missions, the propensity for deployment-related mutinies should not be seen 
as merely linked to the number of deployed troops. Instead, the deployment grievances build on 
existing tensions and suspicions between the senior and junior ranks in many militaries in the region.  
Deployments, and peacekeeping deployments in particular, may provide new avenues for material 
grievances, but the underlying accusations against the senior military hierarchy are part of a wider 
regional and historic narrative. Deployments often serve to exacerbate tensions between the ranks as 
the hardship and danger associated with deployments are experienced mostly by junior soldiers and 
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place them at particular odds with senior hierarchies stationed back home.  Additionally, new or 
existing grievances are intensified under conditions that place the lives of soldiers at risk.   
  While the West African region may be prone to mutinies and other military indiscipline, the impact of 
deployment grievances, the ability to compare conditions with foreign contingents, and deployment-
linked unit cohesion, are applicable to deployed units beyond West Africa. Thus, lessons learned from 
West African deployment-related mutinies can be valuable warnings for other regions. Mutinies are 
often viewed as singular events but their negative implications on military and state stability should not 
be overlooked.  Deployment-related grievances in West Africa have led directly to coups, for example 
the case of Sierra Leone in 1992, and have intensified divisions that became contributing factors in 
coups, for example the mutinies that preceded the coup in Gambia in 1994. In the case of a 
peacekeeping related mutiny in Nigeria in 2008, the army acknowledged that the incident continued to 
have ‘negative implications on the morale and disposition’ of the military ranks ‘towards one another’ 
even after years had passed.72  Understanding common grievances and dynamics that attribute to 
deployment-related mutinies can serve as the first step to developing ways to reduce them, a goal that 
governments, military leaders, and even rank and file soldiers would likely support. 
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